Rational Expectation and Education Rewarding: The Case of Chinese Off-Farm Wage Employment by Hou, Linke et al.
Rational Expectation and Education Rewarding: The Case of Chinese Off-Farm 
Wage Employment 
 
Linke Hou and Xiaobing Wang 
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy 
Institute of Geographical Science and Natural Resource Research 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
 
Xiaohua Yu
* * * * 
Junior Professor 
Courant Research Centre “Poverty, Equity and Growth” 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen 
Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany 
Phone: +49-551-39 14066 




Paper prepared for presentation at the EAAE 2011 Congress 
Change and Uncertainty 
Challenges for Agriculture, 
Food and Natural Resources 
 
August 30 to September 2, 2011 
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
Copyright 2011 by [Linke Hou, Xiaobing Wang and Xiaohua Yu].    All rights reserved.    Readers 
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
*Corresponding Author 
  





  This study establishes a life-cycle model that a representative agent chooses optimal time of 
education to maximize his/her life earning, which implies that there may exist nonlinear relation 
between education and earning. Using the data of Chinese off-farm wage employment, we find that 
the duration of schooling years will increase by 1.7 years with 1 percent increase in rate of return to 
education. The empirical results also indicate that controversies about return to education might 
arise from model misspecification without consideration of nonlinearity and sample selection. 
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Introduction 
Since  Jacob  Mincer  published  his  theory  of 
human capital earning in 1957 and 1958, there 
has been a recognition that the key feature of 
the labor market is its linking between market 
wage  and  the  unobserved  quantity  of  skills 
owned  by  an  individual  (Rosen,  1992).  The 
most  widely  used  form  of  Mincer  (1974) 
earning  equation,  in  which  logarithmic 
earnings  are modeled  as the sum of a linear 
function of years of education and a quadratic 
function of years of potential experience, has 
been  applied  to  a  large  amount  of  empirical 
studies for different countries. For instance, a 
meta  analysis  by  Liu  (2008)  has 
comprehensively reviewed 125 estimates from 
25 primary studies of return to schooling even 
for China, and finds the variance of the return 
to  education  is  very  large  which  can  be 
attributed to a lot of factors, such as samples 
and  methods.  Heckman,  Lochner  and  Todd 
(2003) also have a comprehensive review of the 
methodological  issues  for  Mincer  earning 
equation. 
With  its  strong  policy  implication  that 
high  education  premium  supports  more 
favorable investment on education, the Mincer 
models  are  popular  for  the  sake  of 
comparability in the contexts of a large number 
of empirical studies for different countries and 
time  periods.  With  certain  extensions  and 
modifications  several  approaches  have  been 
developed to improve the estimation to acquire 
consistent  estimators  by  correcting  potential 
bias  due  to  omitted  variables,  such  as 
instrumental-variable estimations (Angrist and 
Krueger  ,1991).  In  addition,  Levhari  and 
Weiss (1974) and Hogan and Walker( 2002) 
found  that  investment  in  human  capital 
declines  due  to  increase  in  uncertainty 
regarding  the  return  to  human  capital 
investment.  Their  conclusions  have  been 
mirrored  by  Palacios-Huerta  (2003)  that 
returns to human capital include a substantial 
risk  premium  to  a  larger  extent  of  the 
pertained uncertain returns to human capital.   
An implicit assumption for Mincer wage 
equation is that education is exogenous. The 
fact of heterogeneous schooling years  makes 
this assumption too strong to truly evaluate the 
return to education. For a rational person, there 
is a decision of a life-time allocation between 
human capital accumulation and working time 
is subject to learning ability and conditions of 
the exogenous labor market (Lucas, 2004) . On 
the  one  side,  duration  of  schooling  is  well 
documented  as  an  investment  on  human 
capital,  in  turn,  return  rate  to  education  is 
internal rate of return to human capital, which 
will equal to marginal productivity of workers 
in the competitive labor market, Usually, the 
more  education  laborers  obtained,  the  higher 
premium he/she will obtain, vice verse. On the 
other side, education, which is not always free, 
incurs  forgone-earning  cost  of  investment. 
Furthermore,  the  longer  they  stay  in  school, 
the shorter they work in a life time, vice verse. 
Trading off between the potential benefit from 
education  and  costs  incured  per  se,  agent 
chooses optimal schooling to maximize their 
life-time  utility  (Becker  ,1962; 
Heckman ,1976). 
Furthermore, nonlinearity in the return to 
schooling  has  been  evolved  in  the  recent 
studies in order to have a better fit. This more 
flexible  specification  is  based  on  the 
hypothesis that in the presence of " education 
credential”  or  “sheepskin”  effects,  one  more 
year  of  education  at  different  level,  for 
example, at primary school or at university, or 
same years of education but with or without a 
diploma, does deserve to the different return 
(Jaeger  and  Page,  1996).  Relaxation  of 
linearity in schooling by adding indicator for 
each  year  of  schooling  caused  substantial 
differences  in  rate  of  return  to  schooling, 
especially  for  schooling  level  with  degree  
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completion year (Heckman, Lochner and Todd 
2003).  Furthermore,  there  is  an  obvious 
increase  over  time  in  the  marginal  return  to 
education  (Zhang,  et  al.,2005).  Using  data 
from 12 countries, Trostel (2005) proved that a 
Mincer wage equation with polynomial terms 
of shcooling performs better than the one only 
with first-order term by likelihood ratio tests. 
Thus, the conclusion is reached that marginal 
rate  of  return  is  increasing  at  low  level  of 
schooling while decreasing at high level above 
(Trostel,2005). 
  However, the nonlinearity of education 
can  also be  explained by  the endogeneity of 
education.  If  education  is  endogenous, 
schooling will be a function of expected return 
to education, so that schooling and the return 
to education are consequently correlated in a 
usual  Mincer  wage  equation  with  linear 
schooling,  and  the  estimated  coefficient  for 
schooling  is  hence  biased  and  not  a  “real” 
return.  In  addition,  this  correlation  between 
schooling  and  return  also  possibly  creates  a 
nonlinear  relation  in  the  reduced  form  of 
Mincer wage equation. 
  In  order  to  identify  the  real  return  to 
education,  following  Lucas  (2004)  we 
establish  a  life-cycle  model  that  an  agent 
chooses  optimal  time  of  human  capital 
accumulation  to  maximize  his/her  whole  life 
utility, given the expected return to education. 
After  identifying  the  relation  between 
education and its return, we reach a reduced 
form of Mincer wage Equation to estimate. 
In  addition,  a  dataset  of  off-farm 
employment  wage  from  China  is  used  as  an 
empirical example to examine the theoretical 
framework. In a country where fast economic 
growth  has  lasted  for  more  than  30  years, 
off-farm  employment  is  being  one  of  most 
important  income  sources  for  farmers. 
Particularly,  there  are  a  lot  of  controversies 
about the return to education in China in the 
current literature (de Brauw and Rozelle 2008; 
Liu  2008).  Hopefully,  the  theoretical  model 
and  the  findings  in  this  study  can  also 
contribute  to  reconciliation  of  the 
controversies  specifically  from  a 
methodological perspective. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows: 
Section 2 presents a theoretical framework and 
the related empirical specifications to explain 
the nonlinearity in rate of return to education 
subject  to  a  rational  expectation.  Section  3 
gives  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  data 
collected in the three provinces in rural China 
for the year of 2004. In section 4 we present 
the  empirical  results  and  its  policy 
implications. The last section concludes.   
Theoretical framework and 
econometric model 
Theoretical framework   
Following  Lucas  (2004),  suppose  a  rational 
agent make a decision to allocate his life into 
two periods: human capital accumulation and 
working.  Different  from  Lucas’  assumption 
(2004) of infinite life horizon, the life before 
the  retirement  of  an  agent  is  fixed,  and 
standardized.  Assuming  that  the  time  for 
human capital accumulation is  t, the time for 
working  is  1 t - .  Human  capital  function  is 
assumed to be 
(1) H At =                                                                                                        
where H is  accumulated  human  capital, 
and A captures  ability  of  learning  or 
heterogeneities in human capital accumulation . 
We also assume wagew  in the second period 
is  fixed  as  it  only  depends  on  accumulated 
human capital in the first period. By original 
Mincer Wage equation,   
0 (2)
H w w e
b =                                                                                                                                                
where 0 w   is  base  wage  for  this  person,  and 
b is  the  expected  return  to  human  capital.  
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Substituting  equation  (1)  into  (2)  and 
assuming the discount rate is  r, gives the life 
earning 0 W , and   
1
0
0 0 3 ( )
At rs At rt At r
t
w
W w e e ds e e
r
b b b - - - = = - ∫ （ ）                                                                
In order to maximize the life earning 0 W , the 
first-Order  condition  with  respect  to  t for 











                                                                                                                                         
which gives an solution to the optimal time for 
human  capital  accumulation.,  and  it  is  a 
function of the return to human capital  b , the 
ability of human capital accumulation  A, and 
the discounting rater. Obviously, the return to 
education  and  education  time  are  correlated 
which should be mirrored in empirical models. 
Equation (4) also indicates that the sufficient 
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Equation  (5)  shows  the  conditions  for 
education  participation.  If  the  return  to 
education  b is  given,  and  the  accumulation 










, this person will not 
accumulate  any  human  capital,  and 
consequently only obtains the base wage in his 
whole life. Similarly, If  A  is given, and the 









  ;  neither  will  this 
person participate in education.   
Furthermore,  taking  first-order  derivative 
respectively  with  respect  to  b ,  A and  r in 
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In addition, when  ris relatively small,   
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The results indicate that the optimal time 
of human capital accumulation increases in the 
return  to  human  capital  and  the  speed  of 
human capital accumulation, but decreases in 
the discounting rate. 
Econometric Model 
We  start  from  a  classical  Mincer  wage 
equation to estimate the return to education, 
(7) ln w E X b g = +     ,                                                                                                                         
where E   is  the  years  of  education;  X is  a 
vector of other variables, and  g is a vector of 
the corresponding coefficients. 
However,  Equation  (4)  and  (6.a)  show  that 
education time is a function of the return rate 
to  human  capital,  and  particularly  they  are 
positively  correlated.  If  we  simply  estimate 
Equation  (7),  the  results  might  be  biased. 
Following  the  above-mentioned  theoretical 
model, specifically Equation (4) and (6.a), in 
order  to  study  the  return  to  education  of 
migrants, we nevertheless simply assume   
0 1 (8. ) a E a a b = + ,                                                                             
where  0 a denotes  threshold  education  which 
is  needed  for  compensating  the  costs  for 
education  and  0 0 a > .  If  one’s  education  is 
lower  than  0 a   education,  the  return  from 
education  in  the  future  cannot  compensate 
her\his opportunity cost. It is the main reason 
that  many  countries  introduce  compulsory 
education;  and 1 a   is  the  marginal  impact  of 
return  to  education  on  education  year  and 
1 0 a > which  is  supported  by  Equation  (6.a). 
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which is the internal rate of return to education. 
Substituting Equation (8.b) into (7), we have 
^ ^
2
0 1 (9) lnw E E X a a g = + +                                                                                                  
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Then  equation  (9)  shows  that  logarithm 
of wage is a quadratic function of education if 
rational decision of education is considered. It 
is easy to conclude that 
^
0 a   is negative while 
^
1 a   is positive. Thus, it builds up a theoretical 
foundation  for  the  nonlinear  return  to 
education. In addition, the coefficient for the 
second-order term of education is exactly the 
inverse of the marginal return to education on 
education year. 
Furthermore,  equation  (9)  shows  the 
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In sum, the key assumption in our model 
is  that  individual  has  rational  expectation  of 
return to education. If people allocate life time 
between schooling and working according to 
expected reward to schooling, nonlinearity in 
marginal return to education inherently will be 
supported. This has been proven by our model, 
and  consistent  with  the  current  literature 
(Trostel,  2004).  We  will  give  empirical 
evidence from job market of rural migrant in 
China in the next sections. 
Data description 
This study uses fixed-point rural survey data 
series  from  Zhejiang,  Hubei  and  Yunnan 
provinces  conducted  by  the  Research  Center 
for  Rural  Economy,  Ministry  of  Agriculture, 
China  in  2004.  The  sample  is  based  on  a 
multistage,  random-cluster  process.  Counties, 
which are below province-level administrative 
units,  were  stratified  by  income  level  and 
selected based on a weighted sampling scheme. 
Then,  the  villages  within  the  counties  were 
randomly  chosen  according  to  geographic 
characteristics  (plain,  hilly,  or  mountainous 
area),  location  (suburb  of  city  or  not),  and 
economic  features  defined  as  mainly 
agriculture,  forestry,  husbandry,  fishery  or 
others  (Benjamin,  1992).  Subsequently,  the 
households  are  randomly  selected  from  the 
respective villages. Within each household, the 
survey  records  the  detailed  information  of 
each laborer.     
The  survey  consists  of  around  7,800 
individuals  from  1,887  households  over  30 
villages in the surveyed provinces. Migrant is 
defined as the rural labourer, who temporarily 
or  permanently  migrates  outsides  the  home 
village to conduct various kinds of economic 
activities  with  monetary  return  (Taylor, 
Rozelle and de Brauw 2003; Zhang, de Brauw 
and Rozelle 2004). With the omission of the 
rural  labor  employed  in  the  locality  in  the 
employment of either on or off-farm, there are 
1453  agricultural  migrants  in  the  final 
estimations (Table 1). 
The three provinces chosen in this study 
are representative according to the geographic 
location and migrant status. Table 1 presents 
occupation  structure  of  rural  labor  force.  In 
Zhejiang-a developed coastal province, around 
47  percent  of  rural  labor  takes  the  off-farm 
employment  away  from  the  hometown  is 
much  more  than  that  in  Hubei  and  Yunnan 
located  in  mid  and  western  China, 
respectively. 
  Table  2  presents  the  statistical 
description  of  the  migrant  laborers.  The 
dependent variable-daily wage is computed by 
dividing the monetary earning over the year by 
the  working  days  of  all  of  the  employed 
activities.  The  dependent  variable  is  daily 
wage,  which  is  taken  as  earning  measure. 
Average daily wage earned by migrant farmer 
is roughly 32 Yuan/day with a large variation 
within group (standard error 39.6) (Column 5, 
row  4).  Migrant  workers  are  more  educated, 
younger and healthier than those who work on 
farm (de Brauw et al., 2002). Migrant workers 
averagely  take  7.38  schooling  years  of 
education, around 1.75 years longer than that 
of farmers (Column 10, row 4). With respect 
to  the  education  attainment  level,  the 
percentage  of  migrant  workers  who  finished 
high school education (8 percent, Column 12, 
row 4) is double than that of farm counterpart 
(4 percent, Column 12, row 3)    .   
Experience  contributes  to  increase  of 
income, which is proxied by age. The average 
age of migrant worker is 33.5 years old, which 
is about 8.5 years younger than that of farmers.   
Other  variables,  which  might  create  wage 
premium for individuals, are also added in the  
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equation. Dummy of gender, health status and 
occupation  are  all  controlled  by  eliminating 
premium effect on wage. The share of the men 
in the migrant sector is 62 percent while that in 
the  farm  sector  is  45  percent.    Majority  of 
migrant workers (26 percent) are employed in 
manufacture  sector  while  18  percent  are 
working  in  service  sector.  Almost  all  of  the 
migrant workers reported that he/she is healthy. 
Farmers who lived in wealthier village proxied 
by net income per capita at village level prefer 
to work as migrants (bottom row). 
Empirical results 
Our main econometric model explicitly asserts 
that  logarithmic  earning  are  modelled  as  a 
quadratic  function  of  schooling  years 
(Equation 9) when a rational agent makes the 
optimal time allocation of schooling in a fixed 
life-time  horizon.  To  conduct  the  empirical 
estimations, we used a fixed effect model, in 
which  village  dummies  are  used  to  control 
heterogeneity  among  villages.  If  we  just 
estimate  Equation  (9)  using  OLS,  a  sample 
selection  problem  arise  since  people  with 
shadow  or  reservation  wage  higher  than 
offered  wage  are  not  observable  (Heckman 
1976).    In rural China, those people, who are 
not qualified for urban employment, are also 
excluded  from  job  market.  Consequently,  if 
there  is  no  correction  for  this  selection 
problem, biased estimators incur. To account 
for  this  possible  bias,  a  Heckman  selection 
model  is  applied  to  incorporate  choice  of 
migration job. 
The  empirical  results  are  reported  in 
Table  3.  Fixed-effects  models  with  and 
without  controlling  for  sample  selection  are 
first applied to the Mincer equation under the 
assumption  of  the  linearity  in  return  to 
education  (model  1  and  2).  To  deeply 
investigate  the  return  to  education  we  then 
conducted the OLS regressions considering the 
appearance of sample selection bias without or 
with  village  fixed-effects  (model  3  and  4). 
Likelihood  ratio  test  indicates  that  the 
resulting Chi-square statistics of 502 with 26 
degrees of  freedom strongly rejects the OLS 
model (model 3) at the 1 percent significance 
level,  suggesting  that  fixed-effects  model 
(model 4) is preferred in empirical explanation. 
Different from de Brauw and Rozelle (2008) 
who  use  two-step  approach  to  incorporate 
determination  of  off-farm  employment  into 
wage equation, we estimate selection function 
and  wage  function  simultaneously  to  obtain 
more efficient results. Estimations of relation 
between earning-schooling are reported in the 
upper  part  of  Table  3  while  the  results  of 
off-farm  employment  selection  equation  are 
shown in the low part of Table 3.   
First,  the  likelihood  ratio  tests  strongly 
reject  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  sample 
selection  in  wage  equation,  indicating  that 
choice of off-farm job is systematically related 
with some attributes of farmers. This result is 
consistent  with  the  study  by  de  Brauw  and 
Rozelle (2008) and implies that the previous 
studies  without  considering  the  sample 
selection bias is not sufficient to explain the 
return  rate  to  education  for  the  migrant 
laborers  in  rural  China.  Coefficients  of 
variables  of  interest  in  the  sample  selection 
equation  and  wage  equation  are  of  expected 
sign  and  statistically  significant  at  the 
traditional accepted levels.   
Years of schooling and its squared term 
are  respectively  -0.071  and  0.006,  and 
statistically significant both at 1 percent level 
(rows  1  and  2)  in  model  4.  The  empirical 
evidence  indicates  that  there  exists  the 
nonlinearity  of  return  to  education,  which  is 
consistent  with  our  theoretical  framework 
(Equation 9).   
As  indicated  in  Equation  (8.a)  and 
Equation  (9),  the  coefficient  for  the 
second-order  term  of  education  is  inverse  of 
the marginal return to education on education 
year.    Therefore,  the  threshold  education 
0 a is  about  11.83  years,  and  the  marginal  
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return  to  education  on  education  year  1 a is 
1.67.  That  is,  if  the  return  to  education 
increases  by  0.01,  a  migrant  would  like  to 
receive 1.67 years of education. 
By  equation  (8.b),  the  internal  rate  of 
return  to  education  is 
_
int b = -0.071+0.006 mean E =-0.027 ( mean E =7.38), 
which indicates that the average education is 
still too low to reach the threshold education 
level., and the return to education still cannot 
compensate the opportunity costs of education. 
It  supports  the  necessity  of  compulsory 
education. 
Furthermore, by Equation (10), we have 
the external return to education for off-farmers, 
ext b = -0.071+2*0.006* mean E =0.0176 
( mean E =7.38). This rate is lower in some extent 
than those in other studies, where the average 
rate of return across six studies using standard 
Mincerian model (calculated by de Brauw and 
Rozelle, 2008) is about 4 percent.   
Our  study  can  provide  evidences  to 
review the controversies about comparatively 
low return to education in China. Other studies 
show that return to education in China ranged 
from 1 percent to 11 in the first two decades of 
the reform (Zhang et al.,2005). de Brauw and 
Rozelle  (2008)  found,  timing  of  data  and 
methodology can explain gap among studies. 
Since  most  of  models  specify  linear  relation 
between logarithmic wage and schooling, the 
formulations  without  consideration  of 
non-linearity are not sufficient to estimate the 
rate  of  return  to  education,  given  the 
nonlinearity in rate of return to schooling.   
Education,  measured  by  schooling  year, 
not only affects earning in job market, it also 
has  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  the 
tendency  to  enter  off-farm  job  market. 
Selection equation in table 3 accounts for the 
propensity of farmers to pursue on- or off-farm 
employment.  The  coefficient  of  schooling  is 
0.064,  suggesting  that  at  the  mean  level  of 
education in the whole sample, with one more 
year of schooling, the probability of working 
as off-farm migrant increase 6.4 percent. This 
result is consistent with the studies by Zhang 
et al. (2008) and Smyth, Zhai and Li (2009). 
They  found  that  more  education  positively 
affects  turnover  intention  or  off-farm 
participation.  Since  education  is  associated 
with  daily  wage  and  migration  decision, 
formulations  without  correcting  for  sample 
selection  might  be  another  pitfall  for 
estimating  the  effect  of  schooling  on 
logarithmic earning (Heckman et al., 2003). 
Conclusion   
In previous researches on return to education 
with  Mincer  model,  non-convexity  in 
schooling to earning is neglected theoretically 
and  empirically.  This  study  presents  a 
life-cycle  model  that  a  representative  agent 
chooses  optimal  time  of  education  to 
maximize  his/her  whole  life  earning. 
Theoretical  derivations  show  that,  if  agents 
invest  on  education  according  to  their 
expected rate of return to education, schooling 
year  would  be  squared  function  of  return  to 
education.  These  conclusions  are  verified  by 
empirical  results  using  a  representative  data 
about  off-farm  employment  in  China.  The 
external return to education for off-farmers is 
0.0176.  In  addition,  marginal  return  to 
education on education year is 1.67.   
The  empirical  results  also  present  new 
perspective to review ongoing debate on low 
rate of return in China. Since most of models 
assume  linear  relation  between  logarithmic 
wage  and  schooling,  these  specifications 
without  consideration  of  non-linearity  might 
be  a  source  for  inappropriate  estimation  of 
return  to  education.  Furthermore,  models 
without  sample  selection  procedure  might 
dampen  return  to  education  because  farmers 
tend to select off-farm job according to their 
human capital, especially education stock.    
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Table 1. Distribution of Migrants and Non-migrants by Provinces, 2004 
    Total    Migrant    Non-migrant 
  No.    No.  (%)    No.    (%) 
Total  3692      1453    39      2239    61   
Zhejiang  765      356    47      409    53   
Hubei  1801      817    45      984    55   
Yunnan  1126      280    25      846    75   
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Samples by Migration Status 
Variables  Symbol  All      Migrants    Non-migrants 
        Mean      Mean    Mean   
No. of observation    3692    1453    2239   
Dependent    variable               
Wage (Yuan/day)  Wage  11.99      31.59      0.00     
    (28.81)    (39.60)    0.00     
  Log of wage  Lg(wage)  3.09      3.09      ---   
    (0.79)    (0.79)    ---   
Individual Characteristics             
Years of schooling      Schooling  6.28      7.38      5.61     
    (3.18)    (2.89)    (3.17)   
High school  Highs  0.05      0.08      0.04     
graduates(1=yes;0=no)    (0.22)    (0.27)    (0.18)   
Age    (Year)  Age  38.89      33.53      42.17     
    (11.93)    (11.04)    (11.25)   
Gender    Gender  0.52      0.62      0.45     
(1=male;0=female)    (0.50)    (0.49)    (0.50)   
Dummy of health
a    Health  0.48      0.56      0.43     
(1=good; 0=otherwise)    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.50)   
Sector dummy
b (%)  Agri  ---   
No 
report      ---   
Household characteristics               
Number of laborers  Labor  3.20      3.26      3.16     
    (1.11)    (1.09)    (1.12)   
Number of seniors  Senior  0.17      0.18      0.17     
  (age>65)    (0.44)    (0.45)    (0.44)   
Number of Children  Children  0.27      0.27      0.27     
  (age<7)    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.50)   
Village characteristics               
Average net income  Income  3790      4363      3439     
per capita (Yuan/Capita)      (4594)    (5359)    (4016)   
Note: standard deviation in parentheses. . 
a. Health status is self-reported by the family members, which has been categorized into five scales: 
excellent, good, medium, bad and disable. Disable person does not account as the laborers, and thus being 
dropped from this study. For this study, the dummy variable of health is defined as 1 with being excellent in 
health, 0 otherwise. 
b. Agriculture here means off-farm job related to agriculture, for example, repairing agricultural machinery. 
Limited by space, they are not reported here.  
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Table 3. Empirical Results of Mincer Model   
    Linear return model    Non-linear return model 
    Model 1  Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
Individual Characteristics           
Schooling  0.021  0.002    -0.046    -0.071 
  (3.267)***  (0.243)    (-2.285)**    (-3.050)*** 
Schooling^
2  -------      0.004    0.006 
        (2.526)**    (3.798)*** 
Age  0.071  0.077    0.078    0.086 
  (7.368)***  (8.134)***    (8.207)***    (7.691)*** 
Age^
2  -0.001  -0.001    -0.001    -0.001 
  (-6.623)***  (-6.071)***    (-6.108)***    (-4.817)*** 
Gender  0.219  0.075    0.079    0.027 
  (6.418)***  (1.934)*    (2.048)**    (0.595) 
Health  0.101  0.112    0.115    0.168 
  (2.727)***  (2.859)***    (2.945)***    (3.995)*** 
Manu
a  -0.081  -0.089    -0.092    0.172 
  (-1.473)  (-1.676)*    (-1.731)*    (3.293)*** 
Construct  -0.062  -0.079    -0.084    -0.073 
  (-0.901)  (-1.183)    (-1.252)    (-1.011) 
Transport  0.166  0.174    0.182    0.590 
  (2.083)**  (2.219)**    (2.324)**    (6.812)*** 
Service  -0.080  -0.079    -0.085    0.222 
  (-1.306)  (-1.337)    (-1.427)    (3.635)*** 
Other  -0.183  -0.172    -0.175    0.018 
  (-3.039)***  (-2.970)***    (-3.013)***    (0.295) 
Constant  1.936  2.218    2.331    1.525 
  (9.558)***  (10.992)***    (11.292)***    (6.990)*** 
Village 
Dummy  no report  no report    ---    no report 
Observations  1,453  1453    1453    1453 
R-squared  0.414  ------ 
Selection Equ.                     
Individual Characteristics           
Schooling    0.062    0.065    0.064 
    (7.578)***    (7.882)***    (7.754)*** 
Highs    -0.091    -0.167    -0.193 
    (-0.935)    (-1.643)    (-1.922)* 
Age    -0.040    -0.040    -0.041 
    (-18.906)***    (-18.901)***    (-19.199)*** 
Gender    0.488    0.487    0.490 
    (10.675)***    (10.666)***    (10.702)*** 
Health    -0.012    -0.012    -0.028 
    (-0.259)    (-0.261)    (-0.609) 
Household characteristics           
Labor    -0.042    -0.041    -0.047 
    (-2.109)**    (-2.063)**    (-2.354)** 
Senior    -0.042    -0.039    -0.048 
    (-0.950)    (-0.886)    (-1.082) 
Children    -0.096    -0.096    -0.107 
    (-2.232)**    (-2.224)**    (-2.483)** 
Village characteristics           
Income    0.000    0.000    0.000  
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    (6.623)***    (6.613)***    (9.104)*** 
Constant    0.671    0.649    0.666 
    (5.076)***    (4.893)***    (5.026)*** 
Observations    3,692    3,692    3,692 
Log likelihood    -3360    -3357    -3608 
Wald chi^
2    Chi^
2(36)
 =1018    Chi^
2(37)




1. Sample selection bias test (Likelihood ratio test) 
H0:model has no sample selection bias 
Chi^
2    Chi^
2(1)=17.5    Chi^
2(1)=20.52    Chi^
2(1)=50.4 
P-value    <0.001    <0.001    <0.001 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a. For the dummies of employment, agriculture is taken as reference. 